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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS:
FEDERAL JUDGES AS PROBLEM SOLVERS

MICHAEL J. GERHARDT*

INTRODUCTION
I appreciate the opportunity to join the wonderful scholars contributing
to this symposium on teaching Federal Courts. This past year marked my
twentieth anniversary teaching as a law professor. In those two decades, my
principal regret has been that I have not taught Federal Courts as often as I
would have liked. The fact is that I have found no law school course more
enjoyable—and more challenging—to teach than Federal Courts.
Indeed, my hope in this Essay is to share the enjoyment—and the
challenges—I have had in teaching Federal Courts (or Federal Jurisdiction, as
it has been called at the schools at which I have taught it). I hope to convey
some useful ideas on how to get students excited to take the class, including
how to meet the formidable challenges of teaching Federal Courts. I am sure
that the challenges of teaching a class on federal courts are familiar to anyone
who has ever taught or taken the course. I hope the enjoyment is just as
familiar.
In particular, I have three objectives in this essay. First, I discuss why I
find teaching a class on federal courts to be so enjoyable. I enjoy the other
courses that I regularly teach, including Constitutional Law and Legislative
Process; however, as I explain below, Federal Courts classes provide the rare
opportunity for teachers and students to explore together how everything else
they have learned about the law can fit together and to cultivate the (practical)
skills and knowledge to address the complex problems arising in federal
jurisdiction.
Second, I discuss the challenges of teaching Federal Courts and how I have
tried to meet those challenges. I doubt that I am unusual in how I teach
Federal Courts—namely, aiming not only to illuminate certain topics for the
students but also to help students to hone the skills they need to meet the
principal challenges of the class, including but not limited to understanding the
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complex subject matter and overcoming misconceptions (or presuppositions)
about federal (and state) courts and the utility of a course on federal courts. I
stress to my classes that Federal Courts is a course not just for prospective law
clerks, but for any students interested in how to use what they have learned in
law schools to solve significant and invariably complex problems. To focus
our class discussions, I routinely assign students roles ranging from federal and
state judges to legal counsel to a variety of federal and state departments and
agencies.
Third, I share three of my experiences in teaching Federal Courts that I
hope other instructors (and hopefully students) will find useful. In particular, I
discuss the excitement and challenges of teaching Federal Courts while (1) the
litigation over the 2000 presidential election was unfolding, (2) I was preparing
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on proposed court-stripping
measures, and (3) I was writing about—and the Supreme Court was
considering an analogous case on—the scope of municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 19831 on the basis of inadequate police training.2 As these examples
show, I like to challenge students to consider how to use what they learn in our
class in addressing real-world examples, i.e., cases or disputes that are really
happening and that students are reading about in the newspapers, are hearing
discussed on the news, or are talking about with their friends. I hardly confine
class discussions to contemporary or pending issues, but I have found real
cases help to focus the attention of students and, particularly, to make the
course seem more concrete and pertinent to them. I also challenge students to
think about how to consider the issues we cover from different perspectives
(or, more basically, whether they expect they will think about them differently
if their roles are different). These examples underscore not only how the
practical and theoretical come together in a Federal Courts class, but also how
federal courts are tasked to function as unique problem solvers in our
constitutional order.
I. THE JOYS OF TEACHING AND TAKING FEDERAL COURTS
I am sure the reasons that I enjoy teaching Federal Courts are not unique.
Although it might be tangential to the main purpose of this symposium for me
to share the reasons that I enjoy teaching Federal Courts, I believe they bear
some relevance on our endeavor since they may also constitute reasons for
students to enjoy the class as well. The point is not just to convey my
enthusiasm for the course, but also to discuss why students should enjoy taking
the course themselves.

1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
2. See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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First, Federal Courts is one of the few classes taught in American law
schools that enables students to coordinate just about everything they have
been taught, or that they have done, in law school. In my experience, very few
students, at least by the time they take a Federal Courts class, have been given
any opportunities to figure out how to fit together the different doctrines, skills,
and theories they have learned thus far in law school. As they enter into a
Federal Courts class, they are likely to be thinking that law school is
principally about the teaching—and learning—of various discrete subject areas
of the law. But, in a Federal Courts class, I take delight in showing that
Federal Courts provides a prism through which students can view virtually all
the other subjects that they studied, including, but not limited to Constitutional
Law, Civil Procedure, Intellectual Property, Torts, Bankruptcy, Evidence,
Securities, Tax, and Commercial Law. Of course, law students do not need to
know the substance of these subjects in order to take a Federal Courts class.
There are, at least where I have taught, no formal prerequisites for taking a
Federal Courts class, though I can sometimes see on students’ faces their
surprise in recognizing how something they learned in another course makes
its way into our casebook3 or class discussions.
Like a good physical workout, teaching Federal Courts is hard, but it is
gratifying. You can feel good while you are doing it and even better after you
have done it. It is, at the very least, a good mental exercise. But, it is fun in a
different way than any other class I have taught. Constitutional Law classes
are fun because they tend to feature cases or disputes that are often familiar to
students, are historically important, and require students to check their
emotions and prejudices at the door. In Constitutional Law classes, my focus
has thus been primarily on the U.S. Constitution, modes of constitutional
argumentation, interpretive theories and methodological approaches, and
particular subjects common to such courses, such as the Commerce Clause and
Separation of Powers. Legislative Process classes can also be fun since they
are oftentimes introducing students to an important but vastly underappreciated realm of legal decisionmaking. Consequently, in my Legislative
Process classes, the focus has been on the structure and logistics of the
lawmaking process at the federal and state levels, legislative drafting, and
statutory construction. But, the focuses in both Constitutional Law and
Legislative Process classes turn out to be relatively narrow compared to the
focus that we take in Federal Courts, where everything—or anything—seems
to go. It is not an understatement to say that the materials cover almost every
subject covered in law schools (and then some). It is gratifying to help

3. The casebook that I use is RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed.
2003). There are many excellent casebooks, but I use this book because of its comprehensive
coverage and utility as a resource.
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students discover that the world of law does not consist of discrete subjects but
that these subjects can be integrated, coordinated, or fit into a coherent whole.
It is fun for students to learn not only how the vast world of the law can
actually fit together coherently but also how it can look from the perspective of
federal courts.
Second, the subjects in Federal Courts classes are almost always fun and
hugely important. One of the things a Federal Courts class shares with a
Constitutional Law class (and many other courses) is that one can be sure, no
matter when the class is taught, there will always be something big in the field
happening at the same time. Every time I have taught Federal Courts it has
coincided with at least one major dispute that is winding its way through or on
the verge of being filed in federal courts. Students easily discover that what
they are studying is not irrelevant to their lives, the law, or the world at large,
but rather is unfolding before them. Students can read briefs in pending cases
or, as we have regularly done, contemplate the arguments that the parties will
make in disputes that seem bound for the federal courts.
And, of course, the cases that we study involve many, if not the most,
significant legal questions. There are not just questions of life and death (as is
often the case with state and federal habeas) but also justice, due process, the
“essential functions” of federal courts (particularly the Supreme Court),4 the
relationship between procedure and substance, the relationship between the
courts and other public institutions, the significance of life tenure, and public
accountability. If that is not enough to get people going, then there are
questions about judicial selection (including the measures of merit and
ideology) and what difference it makes for federal or state courts to be
involved in various disputes, including those involving state or federal
elections, the “myth of parity,”5 the constitutionality of subjecting American
citizens to military tribunals, the minimal requirements of due process, racial
and other kinds of gerrymandering, and the appropriate remedies (and forums)
for redressing violations of federal rights by local or state authorities. There is
perhaps no more of an eye opener in a Federal Courts class than the Court’s
Eleventh Amendment decisions, which challenge students in numerous ways
to reconcile the text of the amendment with the jurisprudence and the
ramifications of the jurisprudence for violations of federal rights, or interests,
by local or state authorities.

4. The notion of “essential functions” comes from Henry Hart’s classic dialogue on federal
jurisdiction. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366–70 (1953); see also FALLON ET
AL., supra note 3, at 348–52.
5. For the classic article on the subject, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1977).
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Third, a Federal Courts class provides critical opportunities for students to
think about some big questions (and topics) that they are unlikely to have
thought about before. One such issue that I perhaps enjoy more than any other
is exploring the parity between federal and state courts.6 Some students might
have given some thought to this in the abstract and others might have
encountered it in a Constitutional Law class, but it is fundamental in a Federal
Courts class. More so than any other course that I have taught, I have found
that a Federal Courts class offers the most opportunities (and the best setting)
for exploring with students why it matters whether a particular claim is heard
first by a state or federal court. This question turns out to startle many
students, since they have not had the opportunity or inclination to think much
about life in the lower courts. I push students further to consider strategically
whether (or when) they might prefer to litigate in federal or state court; and it
is fun for them—many for the first time—to recognize that this is not just some
academic question but that knowing more about the distinctive features of
these courts can have real consequences for litigants.
Fourth, teaching Federal Courts is fun because it provides wonderful
opportunities to see how both the practical and theoretical fit together. In my
experience, I have found that most law students have a (very) limited tolerance
of legal theory. But, a Federal Courts class provides the opportunity for
students to test different theories of jurisprudence and to explore their utility.
Law students are prone to look for short-cuts, and undoubtedly theories can
serve as short-cuts (think here, for instance, about conceiving of judges or
Justices, for purposes of such classes, as “nationalists” and “federalists”7), but
part of the fun of teaching a Federal Courts class is to show students that
sometimes they have to take the long way around to solve a problem or that
various short-cuts pose difficulties. The point is not to make students’ lives
more difficult, but instead to show them that they are able to handle—they
have the knowledge and skills to solve—remarkably complex cases.
Last but not least, teaching a Federal Courts class provides an excellent
(albeit not the only) opportunity to show that law school can be fun. By the
time that many students take a Federal Courts class, most, if not all of them
have had the fun knocked out of them. Many of them do not expect the class
to be fun. (Maybe they do not expect the class to be fun with me as the
instructor, but I try to avoid thinking that.) If anything, they expect it will be
hard or at least they are likely to have heard it will be a very difficult class.
But, a hard class can still be fun. It need not be dreary. To the contrary, it is

6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. The terms “nationalists” and “federalists” appear throughout the literature on Federal
Courts. By “nationalists,” we typically mean judges or Justices whose basic default rule is to
construe ambiguities or gaps in the Constitution in favor of the national government, while
“federalists” construe constitutional gaps or ambiguities in favor of the states or state sovereignty.
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fun for students to work together to solve complex problems. It is fun for
students to discover that they have the abilities and knowledge to maneuver
through complex issues. It is fun for students to be assigned to think about
problems from different perspectives or vantage points. Indeed, by the time
the semester is over, I have assigned my students at various times to think
about issues from the perspectives of many of the different players in the
federal courts system—plaintiff and defense counsel, counsel to the President
or to executive agencies, counsel to House or Senate committees, state officials
(such as governors), state and federal district and appellate court judges, state
or federal prosecutors, and Supreme Court Justices. The role-playing is almost
always fun and enormously illuminating. It is fun to challenge students to
rethink their preconceptions or biases about the class, litigation, law school,
and state and federal judges. Indeed, it is to this latter challenge—and its
centrality in my Federal Courts classes—that I turn in the next part.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS
Of course, what is fun for me is a major challenge for law students. More
precisely, Federal Courts classes pose many challenges for law students; and
my principal objective in Federal Courts classes has been to meet each of these
challenges head-on.
To begin with, I assume that my experience in teaching Federal Courts has
not been unique: the course literally scares off many law students. This is
partly because it is a course that is almost always appealing to the students who
are on law review or are planning to do clerkships. More than once, I have
seen students wander into the first day of my class in Federal Courts, take a
look around, and then walk out—always against my entreaties to stay. They
do this because they believe that the odds of their doing comparatively well in
the course are not good. With rigid curves even in upper level classes, students
who are not already at the top of their class or committed to a clerkship are not
eager to contend in a hard, elective class against their top-ranked cohorts.
While a class filled largely with top-ranked students has the potential to have a
good deal of excellent discussion, students who do not take a Federal Courts
class are at a comparative professional disadvantage: they can learn about
federal jurisdiction once they are in practice, but the course would at least have
given them some familiarity with the subjects in the field and the skills they
need to hone to practice in the federal courts.8 In short, students will
invariably benefit from a Federal Courts class.

8. I have had, as I have indicated, very limited success in dissuading students from
avoiding the class because of concerns that they will not do well. I have tried to counter these
concerns by stressing the importance of the class and the fact that non-law-review students often
do well in the class, and by making the class as much fun and as relevant as possible to their lives
and careers.
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I am sure some professors prefer smaller enrollments in their Federal
Courts classes. This is not just because they will have fewer examinations to
grade but also because the smaller group is bound to consist of those students
who really are most committed to, and interested in, taking a Federal Courts
class.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that more than a small number of our
students will benefit from their knowledge of federal courts. Many of our
students will be litigators, and those who do not can still use what they learn to
avoid litigation, to evaluate litigation strategies (or litigators), or to appreciate
the relationship between what they do and the federal court system.
The second challenge is mastering the complexity of the materials. There
is no getting around the fact that Federal Courts is hard. Students need to be
diligent, patient, thorough, and thoughtful in analyzing issues of federal
jurisdiction. Many students find the materials to be too dry, and many students
have not had much, if any, meaningful experience in statutory construction.
Nor, for that matter, have they had the opportunity beforehand to integrate or
coordinate what they have learned in other classes.
A major way that I have tried to meet the challenge of the subject matter
being too dry or complex is to emphasize as a theme of the class the
importance and utility of functioning from the perspective of the courts
themselves. I ask students time and again how a particular issue (or subject)
might seem to a federal district judge (or to a state district judge). At the
beginning of the class, students are unlikely to have any idea how to construct
this perspective; it is likely to be completely unfamiliar to them. So, I often
begin the course by talking about how people become federal judges and
asking students about the essential attributes of federal judges. It is important
for students to understand as well precisely what litigation in a district or
appellate court looks like. I therefore ask students to read the local rules of our
state and federal courts and often share with the students the motions and briefs
submitted in trial courts. I further ask whether—and why—they might brief
issues differently to different courts.
Nevertheless, the perspective, or world-view if you will, of a federal court
is not one that comes naturally to law students or is easily or naturally
constructed. As those of us who have taught this class know, it is hard work to
put together a comprehensive framework of legal analysis; and the work is
hard not just because it requires pulling seemingly disparate subjects together
but also because of another significant challenge to teaching Federal Courts—
students come into the classroom with many preconceptions about federal
courts. In fact, there are at least three preconceptions that students—and those
of us who teach classes on federal courts—must be prepared to guard against.
First, many if not most students will, by the time they take a class on federal
courts, still think that only one particular federal court matters and is therefore
worth their time to study—the United States Supreme Court. They might

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

736

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:729

arrive at this preconception for any number of reasons, not the least of which is
the (mistaken) belief that every legal question of consequence gets decided by
the Supreme Court. Of course, this is not true, and a class on federal courts is
as good a place as any to disabuse students of this misconception.
Second, many students might believe that federal judges, particularly
Justices, decide cases in one of two ways—either they directly vote their policy
preferences or manipulate the law to maximize their political preferences. A
Federal Courts class need not be devoted to verifying or falsifying this view,
but I do devote an early class to the social science literature on judging and
particularly on the problems with many social science models of judging. My
aim is therefore to show students that the law is a lot more complicated than
what they have presupposed and that if students want to litigate matters in
federal courts, there is a lot of law they need to learn—not just federal
constitutional law, but also federal statutes and regulations and the interplay
between federal and state law. The perspective of federal courts requires
knowing its language, practices, traditions, and thought processes.
There are several ways that I have used to help students to try not to be
hindered by their preconceptions of judging, and each of these has worked.
First, I ask students how they would decide cases as a state or federal district
judge. I literally ask them this question, meaning that I assign students to
come into class prepared to act as a federal or state district judge. Second, I
ask students to act together as judicial panels. This assignment is extremely
useful, since it helps students to think about the ramifications of collegial
courts and to perceive how the need to maintain collegiality might influence
what they do. I also ask students about the kinds of claims they would make if
they were the lawyers for the plaintiffs or defendants. The initial, practical
effects of these exercises have been to prompt the students to recognize that (1)
their arguments must be grounded in legal materials in order to have any
persuasive force at all and (2) they need to know something about the courts
(particularly the judges or Justices) before whom they are making their
arguments.
The third preconception with which many students enter into Federal
Courts classes is the belief that federal judges are superior to their state
counterparts. Even apart from whether this is empirically valid (and I have
never been sure that it is), students in a course on federal courts must learn that
state judges often deal with questions of federal law. Moreover, they must
figure out whether they or their clients will be better off in a federal court as
opposed to a state court. It is not readily apparent why (or how often), as a
matter of fact (as opposed to theory), this must be so. Consequently, I make
sure, besides asking students to act as state or federal trial courts, to consider
how their perspective might differ from that of federal judges. Not
surprisingly, students will begin the exercise by insisting that their status as a
judge should not make a difference to their analysis, but I remind them to
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consider throughout the semester the ramifications, if any, of how people
become (and remain) state judges.
Moreover, a persistent theme of the class is to consider litigation
strategy—why might plaintiffs prefer to file their cases in state rather than
federal court and vice versa. Here, I press students to consider the size of the
dockets, the personalities and backgrounds of their local (state and federal)
judges, appellate options (i.e., how they assess the relative quality of the state
and federal appellate courts in their state or region), and the relative advantages
and disadvantages of litigating in state courts of last resort or federal appellate
courts (in which the possibility of Supreme Court review is greater), and of
course the law itself. Students are often primed to think about the pertinent
federal law, but in more than a few cases their clients might fare better under
state law.
There are numerous ways to teach students about federal courts, but I have
found that the perspective that works best at cutting through the
misconceptions (and prejudices) about federal courts and at enabling students
to manage the challenge of bringing together what they have learned elsewhere
(and may yet learn) into this one class is to conceive of federal courts as
problem solvers. For me, it has been especially rewarding (and challenging) to
introduce students to the perspective of federal judges as problem solvers.
Indeed, all judges are really problem solvers; they are literally asked to solve
particular legal problems. This perspective helps students to move past their
preconceptions of federal and state judges, and to consider (1) the nature of the
problem(s) the court is being asked to solve, (2) the constraints on the court’s
authority or discretion to decide the problem(s), (3) the options that are
available to the court for resolving the problem(s), (4) which option(s) courts
might prefer and why, and (5) the possible problem(s) with the options they
have chosen.
Of course, it is imperative for students to appreciate that federal judges are
special kinds of problem solvers. Students know that federal courts do not
have the authority to reach out to decide any kind of problem that they want to
address. But, they need to know more. They need to learn about the statutory
and other constraints on the discretion (or freedom) of the courts to decide
particular issues. They need to learn, in other words, about the problems that
confront courts when they are being asked to act as problem solvers.
A class in federal courts is, therefore, a course on the kinds of problems
confronting federal judges in discharging their constitutional functions and
how they address and solve these problems. To be sure, my focus on problem
solving is not meant to direct the students to think in terms of the costs and
benefits of the different possible options available to the courts, but rather to
consider what options “the law” accords to the courts and the legal and other
ramifications of the options that they choose. In the next part, I discuss several
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of my experiences in teaching some of the major cases or themes through this
perspective.
III. THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
In this part, I discuss some of my experiences in teaching problems that
were unfolding or pending at the time. While I hope that each of these
experiences illustrates the utility of encouraging students to think of federal
courts as special kinds of problem solvers, two caveats are in order. First, I
will not parse the issues raised by each of these examples. To say the least, the
issues involved in these cases are quite familiar to Federal Courts scholars, and
my point in raising them is not to elucidate the issues but instead to suggest the
benefits of having students wrestle with evolving disputes as problems they are
being challenged to solve from a variety of perspectives, including that of
federal courts. Second, I do not mean to suggest that encouraging thinking of
federal courts as problem solvers should be done at the expense of teaching the
“law” of federal jurisdiction. Far from it, the law is central to the task of both
identifying the problem that needs solving and the possible solution or options
available to federal courts. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is anything
special or unique about the approach I have taken to teach courses on federal
courts. Nevertheless, I have found that students are less intimidated and
readier to tackle the complex cases that are endemic to a study of federal
jurisdiction when they think of them as real problems with real consequences
and not just abstract intellectual puzzles.
I begin with Bush v. Gore.9 It so happened that I was teaching a Federal
Courts class in the fall of 2000 and that the timing of the dispute in the case
could probably not have been better—for instructional purposes. For the
election occurred with a little more than a month of class left, and thus we
could follow in class almost all of the legal developments pertaining to the
dispute, except its final resolution. In every class until the end of the semester,
we talked about the evolving legal developments and their ramifications for
understanding federal jurisdiction.
Once it became apparent that Bush and/or Gore might file a lawsuit over
the contested results in Florida, I asked my class to begin thinking about the
claims that each candidate might make, with which courts they might file those
claims, and how those courts might handle those claims. Students were eager
to think like courts, but I asked them first to think like the contenders. Once
they did, they realized they had to think about the relevant federal and state
They
law, which the students enthusiastically began to research.10
9. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
10. It is apparent from this discussion that I had to modify my syllabus in order to make time
for the assignments and class discussions on the litigation in the aftermath of the 2000
presidential election. Indeed, I am prepared whenever I teach Federal Courts or any other classes
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contemplated the risks of litigation (in either federal or state courts or both)
and further researched in which courts they might file their respective lawsuits.
It did not take long for the students who were assigned to represent thenGovernor George W. Bush to decide, as did Bush’s lawyers, to file their
lawsuits in federal rather than state courts. (One argument made in class, as I
recall, was that the state courts, based on the political parties of the respective
judges, seemed at the trial and appellate levels to be more potentially hostile to
Bush than to Gore.) Students assigned to represent Gore did not initially see
any real advantage in being the first to go to court, even though they
recognized that the Republican Secretary of State of Florida, Kathleen Harris,
was likely to rule against Gore’s protests against her certification of the final
results of the popular vote in the State. Once the cases were filed, I divided the
class in half—one-half acting as state judges and the other as federal judges.
Interestingly, each side was curious about what the other was doing
(oftentimes, looking for ways to defer to the other), and we had interesting
discussions about abstention, removal, and certification, among other things.
But, students began to split amongst themselves (and deviate from what was
happening in the courts below) when they shifted positions to start thinking
like judges. This is partly because they were asked to think about what the
problem that either side was asking the court(s) to solve was, and they
generally concluded that reaching the merits of the lawsuit constituted a bigger
problem than avoiding the merits. They foundered over such things as whether
Bush or Gore would have standing to raise a claim in federal court
(sidestepped if either filed an action in state court), which if any claims
constituted non-justiciable political questions, and whether there was a
problem (confronting either the state or federal courts) under the Electoral
Count Act of 1887.11 Generally, the students agreed with the federal court
judgments in the dispute until the Court granted certiorari to hear Bush’s first
appeal to the Court in Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board.12 The biggest
surprise for the class was the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to respond
immediately to the remand in that case.
My point in discussing this experience is not to point out that the students
did not accurately predict what the Supreme Court (or lower courts) would do
but rather that they were thoroughly captivated by studying this incredible

to make room for unforeseen developments. If something historical is happening while I teach
the class, I do not want to pretend it is not happening. Instead, I think of it as the best possible
teaching tool. Moreover, I have not found it hard to move assignments around or to make new
assignments. The critical things have to do with the importance or magnitude of the unfolding
event(s), the size of the class, and my sense of the class’s enthusiasm, interest, and energy. So
far, I have not gauged wrong, but I am always mindful of the potential pitfalls.
11. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
12. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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dispute in real time. They were eager to do the extra work (which either
replaced assignments or served as excellent review or supplementary material)
and then, to see to what extent the lawyers and courts tracked what they found
or determined. They felt fully informed to assess the various state and federal
judicial rulings. The only case that eluded their review was the Court’s final
opinion, which came down during our exam period. Nevertheless, students
came to my office during exams to discuss their assessment of the decision. In
general, my purpose was to encourage the students to develop sensible
arguments from the pertinent legal materials, and they did. It did not matter
whether the Court came out precisely where the students did. What mattered
was the students’ appreciation of the options available to the courts, the quality
and coherence of their reasoning, and the ramifications of their possible
decisions.
My second experience in having students tackle a dispute unfolding in real
time came a few years later when I was asked to testify before the House
Judiciary Committee on a few proposed court-stripping measures. The gist of
the proposals was to strip lower federal courts of jurisdiction over any claims
pertaining to public acknowledgments of God.13 I take great delight, as I have
said, in pushing the class to consider issues pertaining to the parity of state and
federal courts, including the possible problems of depriving lower federal
courts of jurisdiction over politically salient issues. (We know such proposals
are introduced in just about every Congress, so it is not hard to find
contemporary examples for class discussions.) I did not present the
constitutionality of these proposals to the class as part of my preparation to
testify. Instead, it just seemed that the class might find them interesting,
particularly since they involved many of the issues we had been discussing in
class. Consequently, this class, like the one before had done with Bush v.
Gore, began to consider the problems, if any, with having state courts hear the
federal claims removed from federal jurisdiction. While the class sharply
disagreed over whether it was even a problem for state courts to end up with
exclusive jurisdiction over these claims, the exercise really seemed to help
many students recognize the differences between the so-called internal and
external constraints on Congress’s power to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. The nature and magnitude of the problem turned, in the
judgment of most students, on whether there was Supreme Court review of the
state court judgments. If there were such review, then most students seemed
prepared to accept the court-stripping measures. But, in the absence of such
review, almost all the students figured state courts would (or should) have
struck down the pertinent legislation. There were a few who maintained that
the lower federal courts would still have jurisdiction to decide if they had
13. For my dialogue with Martin Redish on these issues, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Constitutional Limits to Court-Stripping, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 347 (2005).
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jurisdiction and that this authority included their power to rule on the
constitutionality of the proposed court-stripping measures. Throughout the
discussions, the class made good use of the pertinent materials in the casebook
(and their recollections of first-year Constitutional Law).
It was hard for the students to specify the problem that the state courts
were confronting. After some prodding and further research, they began to
ponder the scholarly arguments on why some inferior judicial review might be
constitutionally required. It was generally harder for the students to see why
this issue was important if Supreme Court review of the state court
proceedings on the federal claims were possible. We spent a lot of time on
clarifying the “harm” of excluding lower court review of the claims. But, it
became as much of a problem for the students to determine the “harm” or
“problem” with eliminating Supreme Court review of the claims altogether.
We spent a good while talking about the “essential functions” of the Court and
the internal and particularly the external constraints on the power of Congress
to regulate federal jurisdiction.
On the question of the Court’s “essential” functions, I must confess I
sometimes stray from real-world disputes to ask students about what they think
about my friend Michael Paulsen’s intriguing proposal that Congress should
restrict (or dictate) the grounds on which the Supreme Court may overrule
prior constitutional decisions.14 I usually wait to raise this question until we
run into a case involving an overruling, something that usually does not require
much of a wait. Once we do, and the class has reviewed the different standards
for overruling prior erroneous decisions of the Supreme Court, I ask students to
read the Paulsen article and Richard Fallon’s terrific response to it15 and then
to come to class as members of the House Judiciary Committee to consider
approving Paulsen’s proposal. Few topics ever seem to generate more lively
discussion, and none seem to draw the students into a more prolonged,
thoughtful discussion of (1) the “essential functions” of the Court and (2)
whether Congress is barred from interfering with or regulating them.
The final example of teaching federal courts as problem-solvers is the
problem of the scope of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
inadequate police training. It so happened that this was the subject of my first
law review article,16 and I was on the verge of completing the article when it
became apparent that the Supreme Court was considering the issue. Of course,
this had been a big issue for other federal courts for some time, and it would

14. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
15. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001).
16. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and
Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989).
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have been easy to find numerous cases wrestling with this issue before City of
Canton v. Harris.17 However, I found myself teaching Federal Courts for the
first time around the time that the Court was considering Harris.
Prior to Harris, the Court had not spent much time clarifying the
relationship between the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments. It thus took
longer for students, who had been asked to represent the municipality, to see
how the Eleventh Amendment helped them. They did a lot of grappling with
the nature of § 1983, and, as anyone who teaches this area knows, found
dozens of lower court cases on inadequate police training. Relying on these
cases, they emphasized the need for restricting municipal liability for
inadequate police training. Interestingly, they pondered whether (or to what
extent) the Constitution protected affirmative as opposed to negative rights and
defended the view that it only protects the former (and thus there was no basis
for a § 1983 action given that there were no federal rights violated in the case.)
It did not take them long to appreciate that § 1983 allows for monetary
damages for violations of federal rights, and so they stressed that, without
some limitation, the federal courts could destroy a city’s finances. They
thought it patently unfair that the tax money collected from people who had no
relationship to the case was going to be diverted into the plaintiffs’ pockets.
The students on the other side mounted their own sophisticated arguments.
They relied on the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment and argued
that § 1983 should be construed as abrogating the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity (an unsuccessful argument they would soon learn).
They
emphasized the unfairness of the remedies left to the plaintiffs if there were no
federal jurisdiction. They also suggested the possibility that the municipality
would have insurance policies (or subrogation) to ensure that they would not
be bankrupted by court cases like this.
Once the students shifted their focus to how the courts would decide the
case, it took them almost no time at all to arrive at the point at which the
Supreme Court eventually did in City of Canton v. Harris. They perceived the
cases as persistently balancing the competing considerations of vindicating
federal rights and protecting local and state treasuries. Consequently, they
proposed a strict standard that had to be met in order for a plaintiff to recover
monetary damages from a municipality for something like inadequate police
training.
My point, again, is not to stress that the students were able somehow to
foresee what the Court would do. Instead, my point is that the students became
intimately and energetically (and even creatively) engaged in our discussions.
By wrestling with the materials to solve a real question of law, they came
better to understand them.

17. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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CONCLUSION
It is almost as much fun to write about teaching Federal Courts as it is to
teach the class. There is insufficient space to list all the reasons for enjoying
teaching the class and all the ways in which one could no doubt teach it. Here,
I have discussed what I have found to be the utility of teaching students to
think of federal judges as tasked to decide various problems. I enjoy doing this
for several reasons, not the least of which is that it introduces students to a side
of the federal courts they might not have thought about before. Students are
likely to be hampered by their preconceptions about judging, and thinking of
federal courts as problem solvers provides them with a relatively novel,
intriguing outlook on federal jurisdiction. It certainly gets students to put aside
not only their preconceptions of what judges do (and how they think), but also
the political rhetoric about judges being activists or not and the social science
literature describing judges as policymakers who wear robes. Instead, students
can be challenged to ponder whether the perspective I propose fits and how
judges would actually proceed to function as special kinds of problem solvers.
No doubt, a possible problem in teaching Federal Courts (either at all or as
special kinds of problem solvers) is to figure out which of the many problems
that federal courts have been asked to solve are worthy of study in a semester.
I have taught the class as both a three-hour and four-hour class, neither of
which seems to be enough time to get to all that I would like to do. I marvel at
how much we typically cover in only a semester of Federal Courts. No doubt,
this is one of the challenges in both teaching and taking the course. I work
hard to resist the temptation to rush through too many topics and to figure out
the essentials that should be taught in the basic class on federal jurisdiction. I
intend to work just as hard to convince our dean that maybe we should offer
more advanced courses on federal jurisdiction. I already know whom I would
like to recommend to teach those courses.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

744

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:729

